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AN EGOISTIC, PERHAPS EGOTISTIC DIVAGATION
BY ROBERT SPRAGUE HALL
1CAX remember how, for the first time, I became conscious of
my personahty. In a flash of insight I asked myself, "How is
it that / am here?" I remember almost the spot where this idea
came to me, a boy of perhaps nine years, on my way to school. But
it led to nothing more than wonder, and a feeling of standing alone
and unique in the world of my experience, and with the conviction
that every other person must experience the consciousness of a
like isolation and liniquity. Only many years later did I concern
myself with the meaning of self-consciousness and with the efforts
of psychologists to explain it. But now, for many years, I have
had the problem, in one aspect or another, in my thoughts, and it
has gathered from associated problems so many suggestions, that
I have come to regard it and them as parts of an intelligible scheme
of things.
One of the fruits of my college course in Logic was the storage
in my memory of certain significant phrases or catchwords, such
as "begging the question," "arguing in a circle," etc. One of these,
known as Occam's razor, neatly expressed in Latin, may be Eng-
lished thus : We ought not to introduce into our reasoning any ele-
ment that we don't need. The maxim has played an important
part in modern psychology. It is the cause of the complaint, by
those who do not appreciate the methods of that science that it is
psychology without a psyche, i. e., without a soul. In fact, it can
get along very well without postulating a soul, better, indeed, than
can optics, thermo-dynamics, electro-dynamics, without postulating
light, heat and electricity ; for these latter designate forces that enter
in calculable fashions into the problems with which those branches of
science deal. Soul, however, represents no concept that affords
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any assistance in dealing with the problems of the mind's operations.
As William James says. Psychology, \q\. I, p. 182. "We must—ask
ourselves whether after all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated
correspondence, term for term, of the succession of states of con-
sciousness with the succession of total brain processes : be not the
simplest psycho-physic formula, and the last word of a psychology
which contents itself with verifiable laws, and seeks only to be clear,
and to avoid unsafe hypotheses." And he decides "to take no
account of the soul" in his book.
Even the word mind is too vague a term to convey any definite
meaning, or perhaps too likely to carry with it misleading implica-
tions. "Cerebral activity" or "cerebration" are harmless, and con-
venient because sufficiently vague.
Mind is generally taken to imply consciousness or the possibility
of consciousness. "Presence of mind," "I have in mind," "bear it
in mind." are examples. But cerebral activity includes, besides the
mental processes of which ordinarily we are conscious, a vast num-
ber of which we never become conscious, some of which we rarely
become so, and some that, without being conscious are indistinguish-
able in their results from our most vividly conscious activities.
Examples of the first class are the processes that control and regu-
late the functions of our various organs, e. g., the circulation of the
blood, the digestive activities, etc., of the second, the efiforts that
maintain our erect posture and direct our ordinary movements, as
well as those that, by dint of practice, have become automatic, as
we say. Of all these efiforts we were once conscious, and in a gen-
eral way, are still so, but not to the degree or in the manner that
marked their first exercise.
Of the third class are all conscious activities whatever, since we
know of none that is not capable, in some persons, at some time, of
being carried on without a trace of consciousness, e. g., in sleep.
Occam's razor commands us to eliminate this class, and thus dis-
miss consciousness, as an element of no importance in mental activi-
ties and of no use in efifecting their classification. But the late Wil-
liam James has strongly expressed himself in favor of the opposite
view.
"The particulars of the distribution [among members of the
animal kingdom] of consciousness." he says. Psychology, \o\. I,
p. 138, "so far as we know them, point to its being efficacious." and
Ih\d., p. 134, "A priori analysis of both brain action and conscious
action shows that if the latter were efficacious, it would, bv its selec-
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tive emphasis make amends for the indeterminateness of the for-
mer, whilst the study a posteriori of the distribution of conscious-
ness shows it to be exactly such as we might expect from an organ
grown too complex to regulate itself." But he afterwards says,
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 589, "From the guessing of newspaper enigmas to
the plotting of the policy of an empire, there is no other process
than this. We trust the laws of cerebral nature to present us spon-
taneously with the appropriate idea."
But in that case, what is there left for an "organ" of conscious-
ness to regulate? And how is it possible to trust "a system grown
too complex to regulate itself" to "present us spontaneously with
the appropriate idea"? Again, when there flashes into the mind the
solution of a problem long consciously, but vainly, sought, what
organ has regulated the brain? It has become common knowledge
that such complicated cerebral activities may go on while we are
unconscious of them, perhaps in sleep, or while we are awake and
are conscious of occurrences and thoughts quite alien to those activ-
ities. After all, our daily life is carried on in exactly this fashion.
Our cerebral system seems to be arranged in departmental fashion,
each department attending to its own work without interference
from the others. Being in tjie same building, as it were, there is
often awareness of one on the part of another of them, or even
communication between them.
Xow as to the emphasis supposed by James to be given by con-
sciousness. Emphasis is always present, and we are often conscious
of it. But it does not always help, and sometimes it interferes. For
example, when we are trying to recall a name or other datum of past
experience, if undue emphasis is thrown upon a supposedly sig-
nificant circumstance or element, it may prevent the free search of
the mind in other directions and retard its arrival at the desired
result. Even as James says, "we trust our cerebral nature," if we
are wise, "to present us spontaneously with the appropriate idea."
But is it an "organ" of consciousness that lays the emphasis on
this or that in our thoughts? To me it seems that the cerebral sys-
tem lays the emphasis, and consciousness is our awareness of the
fact. Why this should be so is the mystery. Why, for example,
without any conceivable stimulus from the outside world, and at a
juncture of time quite without significance, as far as I can discover,
should the idea of my personality have emerged in my conscious-
ness, as described at the beginning of this paper? Why should we
be conscious, now of the most trivial ideas in our stream of thought
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and perhaps unconscious of the most important and far-reaching
ideas, or again, conscious only of these last? It is true that trivial
things sometimes stimulate cerebral activity out of all proportion
to themselves and that far-reaching experiences are often not appre-
ciated at the time and produce their impressions only slowly and by
combination with other elements. But all that goes on, for the most
part, in our subconscious or unconscious selves, although, from
time to time, parts of the process may emerge into consciousness.
But let me cite a few other passages from Mr. James from the
same chapter as the foregoing, that on the Automaton Theory.
"Common-sense has the root and gist of the truth in her hands when
she obstinately holds to it that feelings and ideas are causes—and
so are furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral motions of
which in themselves we are entirely without knowledge."
"Whatever our ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide
of the mark when we say our ideas and feelings have it than the
automatists are when they say they haven't it."
"The [brain] will be for us a sort of vat in which feelings and
motions [ideas, I should say] somehow go on stewing together and
in which innumerable things happen of which we catch but the
statistical result."
"The feelings can produce nothing new, they can only reinforce
and inhibit reflex currents w^hich already exist."
Now we know that the reflex action following certain stimuli
may occur so quickly that we are unconscious of any feeling, such
as under other circumstances the same stimuli produce in us.
To go back to a passage above quoted. I would say that feelings
and ideas are furtherances and checkings, nay are the very motive
forces of all action. By ideas I would understand every result of
a reaction of the cerebro-spinal system to a stimulus, beyond the
bare feeling aroused, whether the stimulus be from the external
world or from the organism itself, as well as all developments of
such results, by their reaction upon each other, meaning to divide
the activities of the neural substance awakened by stimuli into
feelings and ideas, sometimes distinct from each other sometimes
closely associated. Both would seem to be results of impressions,
ideas however to be definite records of facts in experience, while
feelings are excitements of a pleasureable or painful or neutral
character, by the experiences or by memories of them. It is obvious
that if an idea embodies facts that excited painful sensations the
stimulus that would arouse that idea to activity would awaken to
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some extent those painful feelings, unless the idea had become so
modified by other ideas that it has lost the elements of the original
experience that produced the painful feelings. In fact, all of our
feelings of pleasure and pain except the comparatively few derived
from bodily sensations, are due to ideas. And these ideas may have
gained their power of thus affecting our feelings by very slight,
often by vicarious reference to experience, as when a mere recital
of tragical events, not one of whose elements of horror ever came
within our experience, may arouse in us a lively perturbation of
mind. Is it not plain that those ideas and feelings of which we are
conscious arise from causes of whose existence we should be aware
only from this consciousness? Who can tell why an idea that in
one person arouses a certain feeling, arouses in another person a
very different feeling? Sometimes, it is true, the history of the
individual, as known to others or to himself affords an explanation
of the phenomenon, but oftener its cause is lost in the void of for-
gotten experiences.
Again, the idea associated with a feeling may become lost or
mutilated to insignificance, while the feeling is ever ready to respond
as a reaction to the sort of stimulus that first aroused it.
The elementary phenomena seem to be these, i. e., feelings or
emotions are primarily the results of sensations. They lead to the
creature's efforts to continue in the same momentary environment
or to escape from it, according as the feeling is pleasant or the
reverse, or perhaps the sensations are too weak to provoke action.
There are always a greater or less number of sensations associated
with the one that stands out as determining the feeling. The per-
ceptions that arise from the whole group of sensations get tied
together by mere simultaneity of origin as do the various concepts
resulting from them, any one of which may then be sufficient, when
later entering the mind, to call up one or all of the rest, or without
so doing, so far as consciousness is aware, may awaken the associ-
ated feelings.
"If we start," says James, "from the frog's spinal cord and
reason by continuity saying, as that acts so intelligently, though
unconscious, so the higher centers, though conscious may have the
intelligence they show quite as mechanically based ; we are imme-
diately met by the exact counter argument from continuity," i. e.,
starting from the hemispheres, "as these owe their intelligence to
the consciousness which we know to be there, so the intelligence of
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the spinal cord's acts must be due to the invisible [unfelt?] pres-
ence there of a consciousness lower in degree."
The error here lies in assuming the very thing to be determined,
i. e., that consciousness \s a cause of intelligence.
"All arguments from continuity," continues James, "work in
two ways : you can either level up or level down by their means.
And it is clear that such arguments as these can eat each other up
to all eternity."
Why not accept the truth of both arguments, and reconcile their
apparent inconsistency by avoiding the quite gratuitous assumption
that consciousness has any causal efficacy whatever? The facts
then appear to be that the various parts of the nervous system are
capable of intelligent action in their several spheres of influence
and that in the hemispheres this action may be accompanied by con-
sciousness. The action need not, in any case, be stigmatized by the
adjective "mechanical," which has acquired a derogatory sense,
and is besides misleading. It is enough to say "reflex," meaning
responsive to stimuli such as we find to affect nervous organisms.
We know not how any brain activity gives rise to thought, or,
indeed, Avhat thought is, but we need not assume what we do not
know and what may be false, i. e., that our consciousness of an idea
or of a thought is an agent in bringing about such an activity. We
do know that our brains are stimulated and this because of the feel-
ings that we experience. Conscious of these, we may at the same
time become conscious of some idea that has become associated
with such feelings by former experiences. For we know that the
reaction of our nerv^ous system to stimuli takes place quite inde-
pendently of any ideas that may accompany them.
But may not the ideas have the power to reverse the process, as
a phonograph reproduces the sounds that made its "records"? May
not the ideas awaken the sensations and feelings that produced them,
or were at least intimately associated with them? Nay may not
ideas become the sources of emotions of a kind that tend to produce
such ideas? It would seem so. The action and reaction of the
elements of our mental life is so intricate and so rapid that it would
seem to be impossible to determine the initial element in any group
of activities. When we are in a quiescent mood, innumerable ideas
flit into our stream of thought, whether we are awake or asleep.
Perhaps one of these is that of a duty to be fulfilled, and we seek to
fulfill it, or of a pleasure to be obtained and we set about securing it.
But the ideas may enter yet give rise to no tendency to realize them
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in action. It would seem as if, after all, impulses must be sources of
action. And again, it may happen that before we can obey the call
to action that seems to be aroused by an idea, our tendency to do
so is inhibited by an emotion that may not, at least at first, be accom-
panied by any conscious idea. Here, however, we seem to be thrown
back upon some subconscious idea, awakened by association with
that in evidence, which gives rise to the inhibitory impulse. If the
opposing impulses be nearly equal in strength, the struggle between
them is likely to awaken an abundance of ideas. But I should say
that the contest is not between the ideas, but between the impulses.
And many such take place without revealing to consciousness the
ideas with which they are associated. We even experience lively
vacillation in regard to conduct which no reasoning, i. e., no ideas
consciously therewith associated, seems to have any power to settle.
We do not know which course to pursue and simply await the issue
of the conflict. It is in prolonged struggles of this kind that we
become conscious of many ideas associated with each impulse con-
cerned. It is much as if either side tried to draw to its assistance
every notion that experience furnished, yet, when all is done, one
of the impulses prevails, in spite of the plausible array of ideas
opposing its own ideas of which we are conscious. Indeed the sud-
den advent of a new impulse may cut the gordian knot of the con-
flicting impulses and decide our action, without awakening the ghost
of an idea. We stand like the spectators of a combat between two
nearly submerged monsters of the deep, seeing from time to time
exposed to view a fin, a tail, a head, a back, a side, a belly, but never
an organ or part whose condition of wholeness or hurt might give
some indication of how the fight is progressing.
Where we are conscious of a struggle of contending impulses,
we seldom know what particular stimuli called them into action,
even though we recognize them as familiar elements in our person-
ality, unless we can refer them, or one or more of them, to the influ-
ence of some object or idea of which we have presently become
aware. And we never feel sure, after a decision of one of our men-
tal conflicts, that it is due to the impulse whose associated ideas are
most vivid in our consciousness at that moment. We know that any
decision would draw to itself its kindred notions, i. e., clothe itself
in becoming considerations. We also know that we are often con-
scious of an effort to obscure the real impulse that led to the deci-
sion, by filling the thoughts with other considerations that seem
plausible reasons for it. And we are fully aware that this efifort
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obeys an impulse from below consciousness, quite involuntary, in
fact. "Consciousness," says James, "is at all times primarily a select-
ing agency. Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense or in
the highest of intellection, we find it always doing one thing, choos-
ing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice,
emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible
all the rest."
For this phraseolog}^ I venture to substitute the following, as
more accurately descriptive of what takes place.
There is within us at all times a selective power. Whether the
matter to be dealt with is in the lowest sphere of sense or in the
highest of intellection, we find this power or regulator doing one
thing, choosing one out of several or more materials so presented
to its notice, etc.
In short, "the activity of consciousness" is an illusion, or a dupli-
cation in expression of the single fact that we are conscious of
activity.
We can trace something similar to this consciousness in the lower
animals, and must regard them as probably conscious of some part
of the intelligent action which goes on in their organisms, though
language is lacking them to express their state of mind.
Indeed is not this intelligent action precisely what James had
in mind in the passage last quoted, under the name of consciousness?
Is it not "intelligence" that is always doing one thing, etc., and only
gradually developing consciousness, i. e., awareness of the activities
going on in the neural substance?
Animals show character, personality, habits, good and bad, and
are susceptible of being trained. They dream, they have their likes
and dislikes, of persons or of other animals, even of their own kind,
their affections and their griefs.
Most of us. on reflection, are conscious in regard to our recent
activities that they were quite free from any consciousness of our-
selves. They went on automatically or with moderate attention to
surrounding circumstances, attention of which we were unconscious.
Indeed, we often carry on simultaneously, two or more lines of
activity, like walking and talking, and may pay so little attention to
either as to remember even immediately afterwards very little con-
cerning it. Yet each had been efficiently directed by our organism.
No problem, however intricate, no mental creation, of music, of
literature or of other construction, however elaborate, but has de-
pended substantially as James, in eff'ect, declares, upon unconscious
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cerebral action. Our consciousness furnishes neither guidance nor
material for this action, but is simply awareness of its results, and,
to a limited extent of the interplay of the impulses from which they
spring.
One of James's arguments for the efficacy of consciousness is
based on a conception of the brain as an organ of highly uncertain
equilibrium, likely to function at haphazard upon the slightest im-
pulse, a "hair-trigger organization," from which one cannot "reason-
ably expect any certain pursuance of useful lines of reaction, such
as the few and fatally determined performances of the lower centers
constitute [sic] within their narrow sphere." And, "The perform-
ances of a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. Unless
they are loaded, what chance is there that the highest number will
turn up oftener than the lowest?"
And he asks whether conscience can load the dice, that is bring
pressure to bear in favor of the most permanent interests of the
brain's owner. He says that is what consciousness seems to do. He
is undoubtedly right when he says, "Consciousness is only intense
when nerve-processes are hesitant. Where indecision is great
—
consciousness is agonizingly intense."
But speaking, as always in this paper, for myself, these times of
intense consciousness are times when not only am I not conscious
of any power to decide, but am conscious that I am at the mercy of
the forces that are deciding, or trying, to decide, and am awaiting
their decision. Besides, it is very evident that the brain decides,
and rightly decides, many matters that surely do not come within
the narrow sphere of the lower centers, since they require more
than mere reflex action to the customary stimuli, yet it does not
trouble consciousness with such matters. Which means merely that
numerous actions that have to be learned end by becoming auto-
matic, so to speak, even though requiring intellectual guidance, e. g.,
speaking, writing, reading. In such activities we are usually quite
unconscious of the directive efforts that secure appropriate perform-
ance and only infer them from the results. Our desires seem directly
realized without more conscious effort than in walking. Conscious-
ness of effort is not the same as effort of consciousness, as Mr.
James would argue it is.
Mr. James finds a guiding function in consciousness in cases
where the functions of missing parts of the brain are taken up by
the parts that remain.
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But if differentiation of function in fundamentally identical
tissues, in obedience to the demands of the organism be the law of
its development, there seems to be no difficulty in supposing this
law to be manifested in the part of the brain that survives the in-
jury. This would require no different control or direction from
that under which the organism originally acquired its powers, and
Mr. James does not assert that this was by means of consciousness.
Let us examine some of the manifestations of consciousness.
When we undertake to learn any set of movements, like those of
a dance, of the fingers in playing on a musical instrument, or of the
organs of speech for pronouncing a foreign language, we are con-
scious of efforts to bring about certain definite results. In most
cases we do not succeed in our first attempt. We proceed by suc-
cessive trials, and these are conducted by a process of which we are
but imperfectly conscious. A striking example of this process is
afforded by learning to ride on a bicycle, which is quite comparable
to the efforts of a child in learning to stand and to walk. We simply
keep trying, that is, we persist in offering to our subconscious selves
the opportunity to adjust our muscles so as to maintain the balance
of our bodies and of the wheel. How this is accomplished is for-
ever secured from discovery, since it never emerges into conscious-
ness. When practice has enabled us to ride with ease, we have so
far lost consciousness of even the tentative movements that accom-
panied our learning, that we could not, if we would, reproduce them.
They have been lost beyond possibility of conscious recall, merged
in the completed fashion of movement. So, we may presume, were
developed the necessary movements of the earliest living organisms,
by efforts to maintain their existence, and in like manner these once
become habitual, the steps by which they were formed lapsed into
oblivion. Hence we are normally unconscious of the processes con-
cerned in the digestion of our food, of our respiration, of the circu-
lation of our blood, etc. When we do become conscious of such
operations, we know that we are victims of some malady or at least
of some disturbance of our ordinary balance of bodily functions.
Thus pain or discomfort becomes a warning of trouble that must be
met by appropriate action.
But let us take a case in which consciousness is extremely alive,
and which, according to James's idea, as expressed in several of the
above quotations, ought to exhibit the guidance and selective empha-
sis of that "organ." so desirable for the accomplishment of the pur-
pose in hand. Take an intricate problem in mathematics. What
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emphasis or guidance are we conscious of being able consciously to
give or are we conscious of giving? We are aware of holding the
attention to certain regions of knowledge within which we suppose
the elements will be found that should lead to the solution. Beyond
this, we may be conscious of strong efforts to evolve the desired
result, but of no details of the activity aroused.
The study of consciousness seems to call for a consideration not
of the kinds of idea that may figure in it, for we know of none that
is not capable of sometimes being there present, except those con-
cerned with purely physical functions, but rather of the circum-
stances under which ideas in general are extruded, as it were, from
the unconscious into our awareness. Under an external stimulus,
we may be induced to perform actions when the stimulus is too weak
to attract our attention. And these actions may themselves fail
to divert our attention from the subject of our thought. A familiar
instance of this is our avoidance, while walking in deep reflection,
of small obstacles or unclean footing in our pathway. On a more
extensive scale, the same relation of cause and effect may be seen in
the movements of a somnambulist. But at its extreme development,
this sort of consciousness may indicate that the organism has empha-
sized a set of impulses and ideas so different from those usually in
control as to constitute a new personality unknown to the normal
self. There may be several such personalities successively mani-
fested, in the same individual, more or less unknown to each other,
but totally unknown to the normal self.
The late William Morris, in his Neivs from Nowhere, has not
belied psychological truth, in making his tale an example of a dream
so vivid that the dreamer seems to himself to be awake but in a dif-
ferent world from that in which his life has been passed.
I myself have experienced, in brief form, this sort of dream,
accompanied by a skeptical opinion of its reality. Some mystics
have maintained that our ordinary life is but a dream, from which,
at death, we shall awake in the real world.
I would suggest a rude scale of degrees of awareness, placing at
the bottom awareness of conditions of the environment and their
relation to the prime needs of the organism, whose intelligence de-
velops by "trial and error," the capacity to utilize these for its pur-
poses. Next above this degree would come that in which the organ-
ism is capable of valuating alternatives and choosing the one best
suited to its interests. Here, perhaps, may be placed the beginning
of struggles between impulses, which awaken consciousness.
THE "l" 83
But Mr. James adduces pleasures, which are normal to most ben-
eficial experiences, and displeasures or pains, which are concomi-
tants of most detrimental influences, as showing the causal efficacy
of consciousness. It is true he says that Spencer and others have
suggested that this is due to natural selection, since that would weed
out organisms that enjoyed fundamentally noxious experiences.
"But," says James, "if pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does
not see (without some such a priori rational harmony as would be
scouted by the 'scientific' champions of the automaton theory) why
the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not gives thrills of
delight, and the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause
agony.''
The reply is that pleasures and pains of which we are conscious
are only extreme degrees of sensations of the organism which,
usually without our consciousness of them, do guide it in its conduct
toward its environment. And so far from their being sole determi-
nants of that conduct, we are often aware of other impulses so
strong as to decide to action the reverse of pleasant or even quite
painful, though perhaps not disturbing vital processes.
Let me go back to one of the passages from James quoted near
the beginning of this paper, the one where he contrasts "brain
action" and "conscious action." How does he contrive to separate
the latter from the former, with a view to this contrasting? How
can there be conscious action, or better, consciousness of action, that
is not brain action ?
But how about free will? Are we not conscious of a force by
which we exercise choice, by which we resist temptation, by which
we maintain courses of conduct? Surely we choose, resist, persist.
Consciousness does not deceive us. No, consciousness does not
deceive us. We do choose, resist, persist. But the we that does
so is far more than what we are conscious of. It is common experi-
ence that we wonder how we came to act thus or thus. Which is
simply another expression of the fact that the process that brought
about the action has not emerged into our consciousness. But going
back as far as we can in any case of willing, we are unable to arrive
at the cause why at the particular instant when we became conscious
of it we exercised that power or why we became conscious of the
exercise. It has become so habitual to us that we accept it as the
ultimate fact. But the least examination would show us that there is
always something behind it, lost in our subconsciousness. We even
find ourselves speculating upon it, as if another person had acted, as
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in fact is the case— i. e., another than the person of whom we are
for the moment conscious. And this fact constitutes the reason why
the speculating itself goes on, the section of brain activity to which
it belongs not having become cognizant of that which produced or
prompted the act of which we were conscious. That act was in
fact due to "cerebral motions of which in themselves we are entirely
without knowledge"
—
James, as above quoted.
It is ancient knowledge that a man may see that a certain course
of action is best, yet act deliberately otherwise
:
Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.
Why? He is conscious only of a force too powerful to be over-
come by the view of the case of which he is also conscious. A little
reflection will give the true explanation. We act in general as habit
dictates, so far as, in each case, any habit is available. Any general
principle of action that we know asserts itself only so far as habit
has involved its employment. Such habits as contravene it must
be regarded as having been formed before its applicability was
appreciated, or under circumstances that did not strongly call for
its exercise; and can be modified, if at all, only by a strong stimulus
from without. Such a stimulus may be the presence of some desir-
able object or of some danger to be avoided. The stimulus may act
directly upon the habit or mediately through the ideas that closely
underlie it. And the latter is the usual case. We acquire the ways
of a particular social group by living with it and by imitating them.
We might learn them without acquiring them, and that is often the
case. It is plain that doing is essential to the establishment in our
conduct of any principle of action.
As Socrates said, if anybody wishes to appear to be a good flute-
player, he must make himself such in fact. A man may be con-
scious of a wish to do many a thing, but may find that, for undefined
reasons, the self that is he, does not move in the direction that would
satisfy the wish. The impulse not to do so has subconsciously gath-
ered to itself all the reasons that inhibit the contemplated action, and
by the same token has inhibited or nullified all notions contravening
itself. Hence the impotence of casually awakened wishes. They
float into consciousness and dissolve into oblivion, as evanescent as
the waves with which a light breeze ruffles the surface of a lake,
Mr. James discusses the possibility of consciousness helping
"other" and defective "organs," and it is quite conceivable that we
should become conscious of help being rendered to weak organs by
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better developed parts of our organism, or, better, of efiforts on the
part of that organism to marshall its resources for working out its
purposes. Such efforts are so much a matter of routine in human
actions, that most of them never come into our consciousness. But
are these "efforts to marshall," etc? May they not be conceived to
be more or less extensive reactions of the cerebral elements accord-
ing to the character of the present stimuli, i. e., their strength, their
more or less direct associations with previous experiences and the
circumstances that have limited or extended the development of
associations with those experiences ? We know very well the extent
of such brain activities is in the closest relation to the education or
other conditions of life of the individual. But again, the possibili-
ties of such reactions must become multiplied in more than geo-
metric proportion, as the range of experience enlarges, especially
if the individual concerned is possessed of what is termed "a lively
imagination." The resulting combinations must far exceed the
demands of the individual's life, and often, therefore, fail to have
any practical relation with his conduct. For that is more strictly
controlled by habits formed before many of the principles that
might seem proper to control it had found any definite shape in his
mind—even subconsciously.
It sums down to this, that the soul of which we are conscious is
to the elements in our consciousness as Kant's Ding an sicli, absolute
matter or substance, so-called, is to the qualities, such as hardness,
shape, color, etc., by which alone we are aware of its existence. Self
and matter are simply forms of speech, abstract nouns, to express
collectively the groups of elements constituting the one and the other
so far as we are conscious of them.
As, again, James says. Ibid., p. 401, "If the passing thought be
the directly verifiable existent which no school has hitherto doubted
it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need
not look beyond."
But I would have psychology look beyond, that is, look to the far
more numerous elements and processes beneath consciousness and
the "passing thought," if it would reach the real thinker that is the
thought. There lies the home of the personality, the domain where
it rules, were it attains to such freedom of will as is possible to it,
and whence it issues its commands to the bodily functions and activ-
ities, as well as to the "stream of thought." There is the secret lab-
oratory of life, of character, of opinion, of all we are for ourselves
and for our world.
